Manpower Options in a Small Labor-Importing state: The Influence of Ethnic Composition on Kuwait's Development by Looney, R.E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
1992
Manpower Options in a Small
Labor-Importing state: The Influence of
Ethnic Composition on Kuwait's Development
Looney, R.E.
Looney, R.E., "Manpower Options in a Small Labor-Importing state: The Influence of Ethnic





VOL. XXX No. 2 JUNE 1992 
Manpower Options in a Small 
Labour-Importing State: 
The Influence of Ethnic 
Composition on Kuwait's 
Development 
R. B. Looney 
IOM lnternallonal Organization for Migration 
R<print JO (1992), 175-200 
Manpower Options in a Small 
Labour-Importing State: 
The Influence of Ethnic 
Composition on Kuwait's 
Development 
R. E. Looney * 
INTRODUCTION 
In the years preceding the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, declining oil 
revenues led the GCC states - Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates - to diversify their economies 
away from oil. Often this strategy entailed simultaneously diversifying 
from highly skilled, high cost foreign labor (most often Americans, 
Europeans, and Arabs) in favor of less skilled, lower cost Asian 
workers. 1 
In the case of Kuwait, this process was known as the "Kuwaitization" 
of the workforce and took on a particularly high priority. This shift 
in emphasis was due to the increasing feasibility of the programme, 
the completion of many infrastructure projects manned predominantly 
with foreign workers, and in part to address first signs of an 
unemployment problem among Kuwaiti graduates. 2 
At the time of the invasion approximate I y sixty per cent of Kuwait's 
population of just under two million were foreigners, and the non-
* Professor, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, U.S.A. 
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Kuwaitis made up around eighty-three per cent of the total workforce. 
In some sectors, such as construction and manufacturing, virtually all 
workers were foreign. 
Clearly, the invasion and subsequent liberation of the country have 
interrupted this process. However, the expulsion of many of the 
country's Palestinians have made it imperative that the process of 
Kuwaitization be resumed, and there are indications this is occurring. 3 
Many experts feel, however, that, despite public assertions to the 
contrary, large scale reductions in the size of the foreign workforce 
are not feasible at the present time.4 Given the exodus of Palestinians 
and J ordanians5 the initial trend is likely to be a shift towards cheaper 
Asian workers. The purpose of this paper is to assess whether this is 
a realistic alternative towards reducing the overall cost of the expatriate 
labour force. Which areas of the economy would be most promising 
in this regard? What are the economic costs? The implicit assumption 
throughout the analysis below is that the country will quickly restore6 
its economy to the structure existing at the time of the invasion.7 
DISTRIBUTION BY ECONOMIC SECTOR 
With regard to shifts in the Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti sectoral composition 
of the workforce, several interesting patterns developed over the 
years prior to invasion (Tables 1and2, pages 191and192): 
1. Despite stepped-up investment in industry following the l 973n4 
oil price increases, few jobs had been created for Kuwaitis m 
manufacturing. In fact, by 1985, there were considerably fewer 
(4,692) Kuwaiti workers in manufacturing than before the oil 
price increases (6,109). At the same time, the numberof foreign 
workers in manufacturing nearly doubled, increasing from 25,982 
in 1970 to 46,397 in 1985. 
2. The well-publicized expansion of the financial sector created 
additional jobs for Kuwaitis. Over the decade 1975-85, Kuwaiti 
employment in this sector increased at an annual average rate of 
13.3 per cent per annum (non-Kuwaiti employment in the sector 
increased at 15.8 per cent per annum during the same period). 
3. By farthe highest proportion of the labour force was employed in 
the social services. This sector accounted for 43.9 per cent of the 
workforce in 1970. By 1975, this figure had risen to53.7 percent. 
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While the ratio fell to 44 per cent in 1980, it had increased to 
nearly 49 per cent by 1985. 
These trends have continued into the late 1980s. As of early 1988 
(Table 3, page 193): 
1. Over 77 per cent of Kuwaitis worked in the social and personal 
services sector. The corresponding percentage of non-Kuwaitis 
was 53.8 per cent. 
2. No other sectorof the economy employed over 10 per cent of the 
Kuwaiti population - the highest being transport and 
communications which employed 6.7 per cent of the Kuwaitis 
that year. 
3. In contrast, the non-Kuwaiti population was fairly well diversified 
by sector, with 15.6 per cent of the population in construction, 
11.6 per cent in wholesale and retail trade and 7.3 per cent in 
manufacturing. 
COMPOSITION OF THE FOREIGN WORKFORCE 
Simultaneously with the sectoral shifts in the ethnic composition of 
the total workforce, the non-Kuwaiti workforce underwent a dramatic 
change in the years immediately preceding the invasion (Table 4, 
page 194). 
Initially, immigration was encouraged from countries which shared 
common characteristics with Kuwait, emphasis being placed on Arab 
integration and co-operation. Arab ministers in employment 
conferences in 1965 and 1975 attempted to conclude agreements of 
labour transfer between Kuwait and other Arab countries, including 
Egypt and Tunisia, but without success. In fact, from 1975, Asian 
manpower, particularly from Korea and the Philippines, added a new 
element to the country's demographic pattern.8 
The gradual departure of skilled Arabs increased the proportion of 
Asians in the population and at the time of the invasion they made up 
more than half the foreign labour force. 9 Specifically, the share of 
Arab workers has declined from 68.3 per cent in 1970 to 46.5 per cent 
in 1985. Asian workers have taken most of this share, increasing their 
share from 28.8 per cent in 1970 to 52 per cent by 1985. In 1984, 81 
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per cent of new work permits went to Asian nationalities, and less that 
15 per cent to Arabs (mainly Egyptians). Within this general pattern, 
there are several noteworthy trends. The three main Asian nationalities 
in the late 1970s (Indians, Pakistanis and South Koreans) have all had 
their shares reduced, while Bangladeshis and other Asians (in particular 
Thais, Filipinos and Sri Lankans) have increased rapidly. 
While post-invasion patterns of new labour inflows to Kuwait were 
characterized by a trend towards an increasing Asian share, analysis 
by nationality has shown that work permit renewals accounted for a 
very high and growing share of all work permits issued to Arabs. 
1. In 1977, 4 7 per cent of work permits were renewals. By 1987, 
this percentage had risen to 66.3 per cent. 
2. Historically, several sectors relied more on renewals rather than 
on first-time workers. These were manufacturing and wholesale/ 
retail trade and the financial area. This suggests a quasi-permanent 
foreign workforce was manning these sectors. 
Clearly, these trends tended to undermine the country's policy of 
localization ("Kuwaitization") of the workforce. 
LOCALIZATION OF THE WORKFORCE 
In fact, in the mid- l 970s, Kuwaiti officials frequently asserted that 
foreign labour inflows were a temporary expedient. The anticipated 
decline in construction combined with a qualitative and quantitative 
growth in the indigenous workforce would, it was claimed, lead to a 
downturn in the demand for further immigrant labour inflows and 
would result in the rapid "localization" - an increase in the share of 
nationals - of the labour force. 
For several reasons this didn't happen. For one thing, only piecemeal 
measures were taken to encourage the private sector to move towards 
localization. For example, the April 1985 Employment Bill proposed 
that contractors must employ a· minimum share of Kuwaitis on 
government contracts. The proposed quotas were 15 per cent at the 
managerial/technical level and 30 per cent in all other positions. 
The fact that employers were able to reduce their labour costs by 
renewing contracts of non-nationals on less favourable terms, reduced 
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incentives for localization of the private sector, since most non-
nationals were downwardly flexible in their wage expectations. 
Falling real incomes in the private sector acted as a further deterrent 
to nationals. 
Clearly, the assumption that workforce localization could be achieved 
easily and naturally was unrealistic. In particular, it failed to account 
for the need to re-orient nationals' job preferences away from 
administrative and managerial positions in the public sector, oil and 
financial services. 
ARABIZATION OF THE WORKFORCE 
One way the Kuwaiti government could have dealt with the problem 
of a quasi-permanent foreign workforce is through efforts at increased 
"Arabization" of the country's labour market. The principle of 
Arabization - giving priority to non-national Arabs over potential 
immigrant workers of other ethnic groups - had considerable local 
popular support before the invasion. Arabization appeared to offer a 
number of advantages, chief of which was the minimization of 
cultural, religious and linguistic differences. To this extent, 
Arabization was seen by many as a step towards creating an 
"indigenous" workforce. 
However, even before the mass expulsion of Palestinians and 
Jordanians, the principle oflabour force Arabization posed a number 
of actual and potential problems for the country: 
1. Arab migrant workers had a greater propensity to bring dependents 
to settle in the country of employment (thus increasing social 
costs). 
2. Certain types of Arab labour were and still are in short supply, 
have relatively high cost and are less experienced than labour 
from alternative sources. 
3. Potential Arab labour suppliers have increasingly sought to 
restrict the emigration of manpower with scarce skills. 
4. There are clear political implications for the conservative Gulf 
countries in housing a more radical Arab workforce. 10 
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5. Finally, there is clearly a potential conflict between Arabization 
and localization. The better qualified non-national Arabs tend to 
hold those jobs which attract nationals. Arabization may, 
therefore, have to slow down in order to facilitate localization. 
PRODUCTIVITY OF THE LABOUR FORCE 
Despite these limitations, Arabization would make considerable 
economic sense if, in fact, the productivity of Arab workers were 
high, relative to the wage differential over Asian workers. 
Unfortunately, little data exists as to productivity differences by 
ethnic group. What information we have is aggregate, indicating that 
there was a tendency of the Kuwaiti market to use foreign labour in 
a fairly inefficient, general purpose way. The result was fairly low 
overall levels of productivity. 11 
Before the invasion, many observers noted a considerable element of 
disguised unemployment in so far as an appreciable number of 
foreign workers were engaged in marginal activities such as newspaper 
selling and minor services of the same type. 12 The productivity of 
such operations must have been low by any measure, and made little 
economic sense in a capital-rich economy such as Kuwait's. 
In addition, the undertaking of menial tasks by foreigners in Kuwaiti 
homes and in general services did not appear to release Kuwaitis for 
more demanding occupations. Despite the extensive use of foreigners 
in households as housemaids, drivers and child caretakers, Kuwaiti 
participation in the labour force remained extremely low (males 32.2 
per cent, females 4.8 per cent and the average 19 .1 per cent). In effect, 
foreign labour was used in menial tasks to substitute for Kuwaiti 
inputs which were then consumed in leisure activities. 13 
A further aspect of productivity that received little attention was the 
depressing influence of a large and often ill-trained foreign workforce 
in Kuwait on the adoption oflabour-saving technologies. Construction, 
one of the largest consumers of labour in the country, often adopted 
labour-intensive methods, using pfimitive wooden scaffolding, manual 
setting of concrete frames and walling, and laborious means of 
putting floors or secondary fixings in place. Low-budget housing 
areas were particularly notable for their labour-intensive approach to 
building. Road construction, administration of the civil service and 





odds with the real needs of a sparsely populated country that incurred 
heavy financial and social costs for its import of foreign labour. 14 
It might be argued that easy access to cheap, albeit under-qualified 
labour deterred the country from looking for more appropriate 
capital-intensive methods for expanding its economy and making it 
more efficient. With the passage of time, the state had become tied 
into the cheap labour syndrome and planned its future activities on 
the basis of the availability of cheap imported labour. 15 
Yet the real interests of Kuwaitis might be better served through 
improving internal efficiency. This could be achieved by 
merchandising activities designed to raise Kuwaiti productivity per 
indigenous inhabitant and by mobilizing Kuwaitis rather more 
thoroughly than at present, for participation in economic activities by 
making access to foreign labour more difficult or more expensive. 
Such a move would automatically tend also to force up levels of 
productivity among the expatriate workforce itself. 16 
Politically, however, the Kuwaiti private sector is likely to resist any 
constraints on their option of mobilizing large numbers of relatively 
cheap (Asian) foreign workers. In addition, Kuwaiti merchants and 
traders favour the arrival of (Arab) non-national dependents, to 
bolster local consumption and trade. Given these constraints, one 
compromise option open to the government might be to pursue a 
general strategy replacing Asian workers with (presumably Egyptian) 
Arab expatriates. For this strategy to be ultimately successful, Arab 
workers would have to make a greater contribution to output than 
their Asian counterparts. 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
Despite the fact that data do not exist for the ethnic composition of 
the labour force by major sector of output, some inferences can be 
drawn as to those areas where non-Kuwaiti Arab workers made 
proportionately higher contributions to output than their Asian 
counterparts. As noted in Tables 1, f and 3, except for government 
services, the expatriate labor force dominated each of the major areas 
of output. Also, over the 1970-85 period, there had been considerable 
movement in the expatriate labour forces by ethnic groups (Table 4) 
making identification of output impacts much easier than if these 
trends had been flat. 
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Clearly, output patterns in Kuwait will be affected by elements other 
than movements in the labour force, and these factors must be 
systematically accounted for. In particular, the possible existence of 
the phenomenon sometimes known as the "Dutch Disease," whereby 
a booming oil sector impacts in such a way as to create an expanding 
non-traded goods (and services) sector and a declining or stagnating 
non-oil (externally) traded goods sector, may be a more accurate 
cause of the country's post-invasion industrial difficulties. 
The Dutch Disease model is based upon a three-factor, two-commodity 
full employment model of production and trade.17 Specifically, the 
economy is assumed to produce two commodities: one traded 
internationally (either exported or imported or both), the other traded 
only domestically since either transported costs or import restrictions 
prevent the commodity from being internationally traded. The two 
sectors producing traded and non-traded goods are assumed to have 
capital in a fixed amount that is given and non-shiftable in the short 
run. The labour force is fixed in the aggregate, but mobile between 
the two sectors. 
To sum up, the model assumes two specific factors, one mobile factor 
and two commodities, one internationally traded and the other not. 
Based on these assumptions, significantly increased oil-financed 
public sector expenditures produce a change in relative sectoral 
prices. The resultant price/wage movements determine factor incomes 
and sectoral output. 18 
Based on the above assumptions, petroleum-financed expenditures 1· 
impact in a predictable manner: imports expand and there is a decline · ·. 
in the relative price of traded goods. This is a direct result of the fact · • 
that the initial excess demand increases the price of non-traded goods . 
(which are realistically assumed to be in limited supply in the short- ·; 
run). In short, higher disposable income, the relative price advantage 
of traded goods after the boom, plus lower production of traded goods 
at home, (due to their lower relative price and resulting fall in 
profitability), increase the demand for imports causing the trade 
balance to deteriorate. However, the country's ability to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate supported by dollar-dominated oil revenues, 
together with rising prices fornon-tradeables results in an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate. 
Given the fixed capital stock and perfectly competitive markets, the 
demand for labour in each sector depends on the wage/price 
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relationship in that sector. The demand for labour depends negatively 
on the sectoral real product wage (ratio of the wage to sectoral output 
price). This means that a rise in the relative price of one sector by 
more than the wage would increase employment and thereby output 
in that sector. 
Increased output would involve higher cost per unit since it would 
come about through an increase in the sector's use of labour per unit 
of capital, implying a falling sectoral marginal physical product of 
labour, because the capital stock is fixed. 
The mobility of labour and the immobility of capital means that a 
change in the relative price of traded to non-traded goods would have 
an uneven impact on factor incomes. Labour mobility allows labour 
to shift out of the traded sector and thereby maintain or raise its real 
income, while capital immobility means that the returns to capital fall 
sharply in the sector with a lower relative price and returns to capital 
in the sector with a higher relative price rise sharply. 
It is clear that the traditional Dutch Disease-oriented approach to the 
analysis of oil booms stresses the factors associated with the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, driven by a rise in the relative 
price of non-traded goods. The relative price shift causes a reallocation 
of labour towards the non-traded sector, a rise in the output of non-
traded goods and a fall in the output of traded goods. Returns to 
capital in non-traded activities increase, while returns in traded 
activities fall. However, there is an ambiguous impact on the real 
wage rate since the wage in terms of non-traded goods falls, but rises 
in terms of traded goods. Clearly, the net welfare impact on workers 
depends upon the composition of the wage basket in terms of traded 
and non-traded goods. 
The Dutch Disease model appears to be an appropriate starting point 
for examining the country's pattern of output: 
1. While manufacturing increased at a respectable rate following 
the oil price boom, its expansion was less than one half the rate 
experienced by the non-traded sectors. 
2. The differential rate of expansion between manufacturing and 
non-traded activities was considerably greater in Kuwait than in 
a number of other oil- exporting countries over this period (Table 






3. An examination19 of the Kuwaiti economy during the period 
immediately following the 1973n4 period, found a number of 
trends consistent with the Dutch Disease model outlined above. 
In terms of the structure of the model used for estimation, recent 
research"° has shown that oil economies tend to experience adjustments 
over time to shocks stemming from injections of oil revenues and the 
resulting increases in government expenditures and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). 
For example, it can be demonstrated that an equation of the Koyck21 
form: 
(a) y = aGDP + byL + z 
implies an exponential decay scheme, whereby the effect of a once 
and for all increase in oil-dominated GDP would not only influence 
the demand for sector y's output during that period, but would also 
have (in declining terms) an impact on their level in future years. This 
result stems directly from the inclusion of the sectoral output lagged 
one year (byL) on the right hand side of the equation.22 
Impact patterns along these lines are easy to imagine in Kuwait's 
case, where oil-supported government expenditures are a large 
component of GDP.23 Their increase would be felt heavily during the 
first few years subsequent to an increase in oil revenues, decaying 
gradually thereafter. 
The final form of the estimated equation was of the type: 
(b) y = aGDP(E) + byL + cARAB + dASIAN + eDUTCH 
where: 
y = sectoral output 
yL = sectoral output lagged one year 
GDP(E) = Gross Domestic Product and expected GDP 
ARAB = the Arab expatriate workforce 
ASIAN = the Asian expatriate workforce 
DUTCH = the Dutch Disease. 24 
To determine the relative contribution of the ethnic contribution of 
the labour force, the equations were estimated in step-wise fashion 
with the labour force term introduced after GDP. To verify that the 
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sectoral output changes were due to increased labour and not 
(particularly in the case of services) to movements in the relative 
exchange rate, the Dutch Disease term was introduced to control for 
this factor. 
It should be noted that a positive sign on either of the workforce terms 
could conceivably arise from factors other than their direct contribution 
to output. Logically this could come about from: (a) demand effects 
whereby the increased size of the domestic market associated with 
expanded numbers of expatriate workers and their families stimulated 
domestic production. This might occur in some consumer good 
sectors where excess capacity existed at the time of rapid increases in 
the expatriate workforce, and would be more likely to occur with 
Arab rather than Asian workers, and (b) substitution effects whereby 
an expanded expatriate workforce simply frees Kuwaitis to enter that 
sector's output structure. As noted above, this effect is probably 
small and, in any case, would be most likely confined to the public 
services (not examined here). 
RESULTS 
The results of the regression analysis of sectoral output reveal several 
interesting patterns: 
1. In the case of primary output (Table 6, page 196) Asian workers 
appear to have made a positive contribution to agricultural output, 
whereas their Arab counterparts have not. The effect of Asian 
workers, however, was fairly weak, when controlling for Dutch 
Disease effects (equation 4, Table 6). 
2. Neither Asian nor Arab workers appear to have critically affected 
the pattern of mining in the country. 
3. The other primary activity, fishing, as in the case of agriculture, 
was only slightly influenced (equation 8, Table 6) with increased 
levels of Asian workers, but not Arab expatriates. 
4. Interestingly enough, in all the primary activities, GDP does not 
appear to have affected output levels through a distributed lag 
type mechanism. This indicates that output from these sectors 
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was quite sensitive to short run factors, rather than the longer run 
gradual adjustment processes assumed by the distributed lag 
mechanisms. 
5. Movements in the real exchange rate do not appearto have played 
a major role in affecting primary output (after controlling for 
GDP and the labour force). 25 
In terms of the manufacturing sector, a somewhat different picture 
emerged (Table 7, page 197): 
1. Food production showed considerable effects stemming from 
movements in the Arab expatriate workforce, but not the Asian 
component. Dutch Disease factors, however, reduced the growth 
in this sector somewhat below what it would have been in the 
absence of the appreciating exchange rate. 
2. The same pattern was present in textiles, where again the increases 
in the non-Kuwaiti Arab workforce were associated with expanded 
levels of production. Again, this expansion was dampened by the 
appreciation of the real dollar/dinar exchange rate. 
3. Finally, paper products and petroleum-refining followed the 
patterns identified in food production and textiles. 
In general, therefore, Arab workers have made a positive contribution 
to the expansion of Kuwaiti manufacturing, whereas increases in 
their Asian counterparts do not appear to have been particularly 
productive in this regard. 
With regard to private services (Table 8, page 198) it appears that: 
1. Arab workers made a positive contribution to the expansion of 
hotels and restaurants, whereas their Asian counterparts did not. 
2. The same was also true for transport and storage. In both cases 
the appreciation of the real exchange rate was a stimulus to output, 
in addition to the increased number of Arab expatriates in the 
workforce. 
3. Communications also experienced a positive contribution from 
Arab expatriate workers, but this effect was only slight when the 
Dutch Di~ease variable was introduced. 
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4. Finance followed the same pattern as the previous private services, 
with the exception that the Dutch Disease did not appear to be 
particularly significant when the Arab workforce was included in 
the regression equation. This result probably stemmed from the 
fact that finance faced more intense international competition 
than the other service sectors. 
5. Insurance followed the pattern of the finance sector fairly closely, 
and one must assume for essentially the same reasons. 
6. Real estate, however, did not follow the pattern of other private 
sectors. Here increases in the Asian workforce, but not non-
Kuwaiti Arab workers, were associated with expanded output. 
7. Finally, private household services were more affected by 
economic prosperity (as reflected in the expected level of GDP) 
than movements in the workforce per se. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results presented above have several implications for government 
policy in Kuwait. Everything else remaining equal, the results 
suggest that the Arab expatriate workforce made a much more 
positive contribution to the country's expansion than that associated 
with their Asian counterparts. While it is not completely clear that 
this effect stems exclusively from relatively high degrees of 
productivity possessed by expatriate Arabs, the fact remains that 
expansion in the Asian workforce has not really produced the 
corresponding increases in economic output one might imagine. 
The results certainly suggest that Arabization would not conflict with 
the country's major economic objectives and, in fact, would most 
likely contribute to them. This conclusion has some importance 
given recent developments. From over 350,000 Palestinians in 
Kuwait prior to the invasion, there are now (early 1992) only around 
85,000 as a result of the government's decision to lay-off as many 
Palestinian professionals as possible. Over 110,000 expatriate civil 
servants have lost their jobs. 
Asian expatriates are returning steadily to the Emirate, which in 1990 
employed 500,000 Asian Workers. About 30,000 new recruits have 
already started work in Kuwait and recruiting agents in Pakistan, 
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Thailand and Bangladesh report brisk applications for jobs in the 
country.26 However, the results here suggest that the government 
should also carefully study the Saudi policy of relying on Egyptian 
expatriates as a means of replacing unwanted Arab workers. 27 
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TABLE l 





Kuwaiti % Non- I Kuwaiti % Non-
Occupation Kuwaiti Kuwaiti 
Agriculture, M 798 19.7 3,253 3,970 53.0 3,52?. 
Fishing F 4 44.4 5 13 59.1 9 
T 802 19.8 3,258 3,983 53.0 3,531 
Mining M 1,627 25.2 4,828 1,767 37.3 2,953 
and F 48 6.7 668 12 8.6 127 
Quarrying T 1,675 23.4 5,497 1,779 36.6 3,080 
Manu- M 6,100 19.l 25,876 2,237 9.3 21,889 
facturing F 9 7.8 106 21 6.2 320 
Industries T 6,109 19.0 25,982 2,258 9.2 22,209 
Construction M 2,186 6.5 31,418 1,755 5.5 130,357 
F 2 2.9 66 l 0.7 143 
T 2,188 6.5 31,484 1,756 5.4 130,500 
Electricity/ M 2,130 29.4 5,106 2,029 27.9 5,230 
gas/water F 39 18.8 13 5 41.7 7 
T 2,133 29.4 5,119 2,034 28.0 5,237 
Wholesale M 6,250 21.6 22,704 6,297 16.3 32,364 
Retail F 25 7.6 304 30 3.3 868 
Trade T 6,275 21.4 23,008 6,327 16.0 33,232 
Trans- M 2,357 19.6 9,640 4,305 28.4 10,853 
portation F 5 3.5 136 262 49.7 265 
Commun T 2,362 19.5 9,776 4,567 29.l 11,118 
Finance M 1,092 23.7 3,507 1,295 22.2 4,548 
Real F 13 4.3 289 82 12.l 598 
Estate T 1,105 22.5 3,796 1,377 21.l 5,146 
Social M 34,838 39.5 53,371 56,011 43.7 72,203 
Services F 1,906 12.9 12,850 6,877 21.4 25,188 
T 36,744 34.7 66,221 62,888 38.9 97,391 
Total M 57,614 26.4 160,262 79,666 30.2 183,919 
Labour F 2,020 12.3 14,458 7,305 21.0 27,525 
Force T 59,634 25.4 174,720° 86,971 29.1 211,444 
Source: State of Kuwait, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1988 
(Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, 1988), p. 117. 
191 
TABLE2 
KUWAIT: LABOUR FORCE BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 1980-1985 
I 1980 1985 
·o 
.. 
Kuwaiti % Non- Kuwaiti % Non-
Occupation Kuwaiti Kuwaiti 
Agriculture, M 3,886 42.3 5,184 2,715 21.7 9,799 
Fishing F 52 65,0 28 66 55.9 52 . 
T 3,938 43.0 5,212 2,781 22.0 9,851 
Mining M 2,364 36.7 4,075 2,468 36.8 4,233 ~ 
and F 33 15.0 187 43 13.0 289 : Quarrying T 2,397 36.0 4,262 2,511 35.7 4,522 
Manu- M 3,107 7.7 37,432 4,552 9.1 45,262 
facturing F 72 10.0 649 140 4.2 1,135 
Industries T 3,179 7.7 38,081 4,692 9.2 46,397 
Construction M 1,194 1.2 95,331 1,435 1.2 121,543 
F 12 2.1 562 27 2.3 1,160 
T 1,206 1.2 95,893 1,462 1.2 122,694 
Electricity/ M 2,039 25.l 6,076 1,510 20.4 5,877 
gas/water F 29 55:8 23 54 78.3 15 
T 2,068 25.3 6,099 1,564 20.9 5,902 
Wholesale M 4,513 8.0 52,027 5,932 8.2 66,524 
Retail F 64 3.5 1,813 144 4.1 3,331 
Trade T 4,577 7.8 53,840 6,076 8.0 69,855 
Trans- M 7,180 25.0 21,491 6,812 19.4 28,224 
portation F 652 44.0 830 849 39.l 1,320 
Commun T 7,832 25.9 22,321 7,661 20.6 29,544 
Finance M 2,466 22.7 8,413 3,175 18.6 13,868 
Real F 350 19.4 1,457 693 21.1 2,611 
Estate T 2,816 22.2 9,870 38,680 19.0 16,479 
Social M 62,896 38.1 102,271 70,504 33.8 138,371 
Services F 12,565 22.7 42,721 22,441 19.0 95,413 
T 75,461 34.2 144,992 92,945 28.4 233,784 
Total M 93,588 21.9 334,644 101,607 18.9 436,650 
Labour F 14,172 22.4 '\9.105 24,803 18.8 107,325 
Force T 107,760 21.9 383,749 126,410 18.9 543,975 
Source: State of Kuwait, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1988 
(Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, 1988), p. 117. 
192 
TABLE3 
KUWAIT: DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR FORCE 
BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND NATIONALITY, MARCH 1988 
Economic Kuwaiti % Non-
Activities Kuwaiti 
Agriculture/ 946 0.6 7,810 
Fishing 
Mining/ 3,212 2.2 2,816 
Quarrying 
Manufacturing 5,302 3.6 44,858 
Electricity/ 1,738 1.2 5,170 
Gas, Water 
Construction 1,716 1.2 105,688 
Wholesale/ 5,016 3.4 74,866 
Retail Trade 
Transport/ 9,834 6.7 27,104 
Communications 
Finance/ 5,390 3.6 16,742 
Real Estate 
Social/ 114,598 11.5 255,640 
Personal 
Services 
Total 147,752 100.0 540,694 
Source: State of Kuwait, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1988 


























NON-KUWAITI LABOUR FORCE, 1970-85 
(thousands) 
Groups 1970 % 1975 % 1980 
Arabian 
Male 109.2 67.3 128.8 69.6 201.4 
Female 11.6 79.6 18.0 64.8 27.1 
Total 120.8 68.3 146.7 69.0 228.5 
Asian 
Male 
'"" '~ 48.4 29.8 53.4 28.9 125.8 Female 2.5 17.5 9.2 31.2 19.9 
Total 50.9 28.8 62.5 29.4 145.7 
African 
Male 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 
Female ins 0.1 ins 0.1 0.4 
Total 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.8 
American/ 
European 
Male 2.2 1.3 1.7 0.9 4.6 
Female 0.3 2.1 '0.3 1.2 0.8 
Total 2.5 1.4 2.0 1.0 5.5 
Unemployed 
Male 2.2 1.4 1.1 0.6 na 
Female 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.7 na 
Total 2.3 1.3 1.3 0.6 na 
Total 
Male 162.3 100.0 185.0 100.0 332.3 
Female 14.5 100.0 27.7 100.0 48.3 
Total 176.8 100.0 212.7 100.0 380.6 
Source: State of Kuwait. Annual Statistical Abstract, 1988 












































DUTCH DISEASE INDICATORS 




(1975=100) (% per annum) 
1970- 1975- 1970 1978 1981 Agr Man Non-
1975 1980 Trad 
Kuwait 544 168 292 104 69 5.3 6.7 15.8 
Saudi Arabia 183 71 167 119 86 6.1 9.5 9.7 
Nigeria 73 46 117 121 89 -0.3 11.7 9.1 
Mexico 146 20 83 124 89 3.7 7.1 6.8 
Indonesia l 60 118 117 106 4.0 13.4 10.1 
Venezuela 48 34 97 103 76 2.7 4.7 5.5 
Notes: Oil Shock = investment in nominal value of petroleum exports divided by Gross Domestic 
Product at the beginning of each period. 
Real Exchange Rate = Index of local currency-to-dollar rate divided by the implicit GDP deflator 
and multiplied by an index of import prices (a decrease in the index represents a real apprecia-
tion). 
Non-Tradeab/es =construction, utilities. transport and communication. public administration 
and defense and other services. 
Source: Based on Table 11.3 of Michael Roemer, "Dutch Disease in Developing Countries: 
Swallowing Bitter Medicine," in Mats Lundahl Ed., The Primary Sector in Economic Develop-
ment: Proceedings of the Seventh Arne Ryde Symposium, Frostavallen, August 29-30, 1983 
(London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 243. 
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TABLE6 
KUWAIT, INFLUENCE OF THE ETHNIC COMPOSffiON 
OF THE LABOUR FORCE: PRIMARY OUTPUT, 197~5 
(ordinary least squares estimates) 
Agriculture (AGP) 
(l) AGP = 1.14 AGPL- 0.06 GDP 
(20.96) (-2.17) 
RHO =-0.16, t =-0.62 r2 = 0.991; F = 668.45; DW = 2.05 
(2) AGP = 1.12 AGPL- 0.04 GDP+ 0.01 ARAB 
(17.55) (-1.32) (0.83) 
RH0=-0.17, t =-0.66 r2 =0.993; F=439.4; DW =2.10 ,,., 
(3) AGP = 0.36 AGPL - 0.06 GDP - 0.08 ARAB + 0.13 ASIAN \: 
(2.22) (-3.69) (-4.12) (4.82) 
RHO= - 0.54, t = -2.42 r2 = 0. 999; F = 1520.02; DW = 2.70 
(4) AGP=0.71 AGPL-0.018 GDP+0.06 ASIAN-1.44 DUTCH 
(2.79) (-1.45) (1.74) (-1.02) 
RHO =-0.18, t=0.72 r2 =0.995; F=416.07; DW =2.10 
Mining (MINP) 
(5) MINP = 0.74 MINPL- 0.04 GDP- 0.03 ARAB 
(3.37) (--0.93) (-1.65) 
RHO =-0.23, t= 0.90 r2 = 0.591; F =4.83; DW = 2.19 
(6) MINP = 0.48 MINPL- 0.05 GDP - 0.02 ASIAN 
(2.11) (-1.08) (-1.94) 
RHO= --0.08, t = - 0.31 r2 = 0.566; F = 4.34; DW = 2.07 
Fishing (FISHP) 
(7) FISHP = - 0.50 FISHPL - 0.09 GDP - 0.04 ARAB 
(-1.14) (-1.60) (-1.57) 
RHO= 0.52, t = 2.30 r2 = 0.146; F = 1.74; DW = 2.62 
(8) FISHP = - 0.21 FISHPL- 0.02 GDP - 0.06 ARAB + 0.02 ASIAN 
(--0.89) (--0.77) (-3.15) (1.86) 
RH0=0.18, t=0.71; r2=0.667; F=4.54;DW=2.73 
Notes: Estimations performed with a Cochrane-Orcutt iterative estimation procedure to correct for 
serial correlation. RHO =coefficient of serial correlation term. L =variable lagged one year. 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product, GDPE = Expected Gross Domestic Product, ARAB = number 
of foreign workers who are Arab, ASIAN = number of foreign workers who are Asian, DUTCH 
=appreciation of the real exchange rate (dollar/dinar). 
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TABLE? 
KUWAIT, INFLUENCE OF THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION 
OF THE LABOUR FORCE: MANUFACTURING, 197(µ!5 
(ordinary least squares estimates) 
Food (FOODP) 
(I) FOODP=0.83 FOODPL-0.01 GDPE 
(7.82) (-1.87) 
RHO= - 0.48; t = - 2.05 r2 = 0.963; F = 143.94; OW= 2.28 
(2) FOODP = - 0.24 FOODPL - O.ot GDPE + 0.22 ARAB 
(-0.72) (-0.96) (3.22) 
RHO =-0.11, t =-0.43; r2 = 0.963; F= 87.88; DW = 1.94 
(3) FOODP = - 0.42 FOODPL-0.01 GDPE + 0.23 ARAB + 0.02 ASIAN 
(-1.14) (-0.51) (3.36) (0.68) 
RHO =-0.02, t =- 0.05 r2 = 0.958; F = 51.75; OW= 1.97 
(4) FOODP = - 0.52 FOODPL- O.ot GDPE + 0.34 ARAB - 3.88 DUTCH 
(-2.44) (-1.74) (6.83) (-3.84) 
RHO= 0.06, t = 0.21 r2 = 0.981; F = 115.61; DW = 1.93 
Textiles (TEXTP) 
(5) TEXTP = 0.95 TEXTPL + O.ot GDP 
(6.37) (0.57) 
RHO= - 0.15, t = - 0.62 r2 = 0.892; F = 45.59; DW = 2.03 
(6) TEXTP =-0.49 TEXTPL + 0.14 GDP+ 0.21 ARAB 
(-2.41) (3.91) (6.72) 
RHO= 0.41, t = 1.66 r2 = 0.919; F = 37.82; DW = 2.81 
(7) TEXTP = 0.48 TEXTPL + 0.13 GDP+ 0.24 ARAB - 0.02 ASIAN 
(-2.25) (3.67) (5.90) (-1.27) 
RHO = 0.27, t = 1.07 r2 = 0.949; F = 42.11; DW = 2.64 
(8) TEXTP =- 0.30 TEXTPL + 0.04 GDP+ 0.20 ARAB - 2.16 DUTCH 
(-1.52) (l.82) (7.40) (-2.12) 
RHO= 0.56, t = 2.51; r2 = 0.914; F = 23.87; DW 2.58 
Paper (PAPERP) 
(l) PAPERP=0.76PAPERPL-O.Ol GDPE 
(4.34) (-0.99) 
RHO= - 0.05, t = - 0.20; r2 = 0.876; F = 39.00; DW = 1.99 
(2) P APERP = 0.05 P APERPL - 0.01 GDPE + 0.11 ARAB 
(0.14) (-0.50) (2.14) 
RHO= 0.29, t = 1.15 r2 = 0.808; F = 14.00; DW = 1.86 
(3) PAPERP = 0.06 PAPERPL-0.ot GDPE + 0.16 ARAB -0.04 ASIAN 
(0.14) (-1.3) (2.49) (-1.86) 
RHO= - 0.07, t = -0.28 r2 = 0.930; F = 29.67; DW = 1.91 
Petroleum Refining (PRP) 
(4) PRP = 0.87 PRPL- 0.04 GDP 
(3.46) (-1.82) 
RHO =-0.21, t =-0.82 r2 = 0.610; F= 8.59; DW = 2.15 
(5) PRP = 0.67 PRPL- 0.01 GDP+ 0.18 ARAB 
(2.18) (-0.08) (0.88) 
RHO =-0.05, t =-0.19 r2 =0.565; F = 4.33; DW = 1.91 
. 
(6) PRP =-0.38 PRPL + 0.10 GDP+ 0.77 ASIAN -0.50 ARAB 
(-1.28) (2.62) (4.40) (-2.42) 
RHO= 0.02, t = 0.06; r2 = 0.853; F = 13.04; DW = 1.84 
(7) PRP = - 0.25; PRPL + 0.11 GDP - 23.39 DUTCH + 0.55 ASIAN 
(-0.91) (0.28) (-3.35) (4.81) 
RHO =-0.27; t =-1.06 r2 = 0.900; F = 20.45; DW = 2.18 
Notes: See Table 6. 
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TABLE8 
KUWAIT, INFLUENCE OF THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION 
OF THE LABOUR FORCE: PRIVATE SERVICES, 1970-85 
(ordinary least squares estimates) 
Hotels and Restaurants (HOTELP) ~,(,<::.~ ·· 
(I) HOTELP = 0.60 HOTELPL + 0.06 GDPE 
(2.20) (l.73) 
RHO= 0.80, t = 5.03 r2 = 0.330; F = 2.72; DW = l.54 
(2) HOTELP = 0.63 HOTELPL + 0.06 GDPE + 0.26 ARAB 
(2.38) (l.95) (2.15) 
RHO= 0.42, t = l.75 r2 = 0.706; F = 8.04; DW = l.42 
(3) HOTELP = 0.48 HOTELPL + 0.03 GDPE + 0.50 ARAB - 0.14 ASIAN 
( l.69) ( l.23) (2.29) (-l.33) 
RHO= 0.29, t = l.13 r2 = 0.813; F = 9.75; DW = l.49 
(4) HOTELP = 0.50 HOTELPL + 0.06 GDPE + 0.09 ARAB + 10.87 DUTCH 
(2.09) (2.25) (0.75) (2.04) 
RHO= 0.25, t = 0.97 r2 = 0.857; F = 13.51; DW = l.71 
Transport and Storage (TSP) 
(5) TSP= 0.98 TSPL + 0.05 GDPE 
(3.89) (0.49) 
RHO= 0.03, t = 0.09 r2 = 0.821; F = 25.34; DW = l.98 
(6) TSP= 0.57 TSPL + 0.08 GDPE + 0.76 ARAB 
(l.99) (0.92) (2.22) 
RHO= -0.04, t = -0.16 r2 = 0.895; F = 28.33; DW = l.78 
(7) TSP= l.13 TSPL + 0.11 GDPE + l.02 ARAB - 0.60 ASIAN 
(6.05) (2.32) (5.13) (-3.66) 
RHO= - 0.65, t = -3.22 r2 = 0.979; F = 105.75; DW = 2.36 
(8) TSP= 0.63 TSPL + 0.11 GDPE + 0.25 ARAB + 25.30 DUTCH 
(2.89) (l.67) (0.76) (2.00) 
RHO = - 0.34, t = - l.37 r2 = 0.954; F = 46.23; DW = l.83 
(9) TSP= 0.92 TSPL + 0.11 GDPE - 0.19 ASIAN+ 31.52 DUTCH 
(3.62) (1.82) (-l.07) (3.61) 
RHO = - 0.46, t = - 1.99 r2 = 0.963; F = 58.23; DW = 1.99 
Communications (COMMUNP) 
(I) COMMUNP = 0.85 COMMUNPL + 0.05 GDPE 
(4.91) (0.33) 
RH0=0.80, t=5.09r2=0.74l;F=15.71; DW= l.64 
(2) COMMUNP = 0.64 COMMUNPL + 0.01GDPE+0.19 ARAB 
(3.88) (0.01) (2.62) 
RHO= 0.48, t = 2.05 r2 = 0.953; F = 66.85; DW = l.54 
(3) COMMUNP = 1.34 COMMUNPL + 0.21 GDPE + 0.26 ARAB - 0.20 ASIAN 
(7.24) (2.44) (6.61) (-3.42) 
RHO =-0.23, t = -0.88 r2 = 0.994; F = 376.81; DW = 2.17 
(4) COMMUNP=0.69COMMUNPJ.,+0.01 GDPE+0.12ARAB +3.11 DUTCH 
(5.05) (0.42) (l.67) (l.40) 
RHO= 0.32, t = l.28 r2 = 0.975; F = 86.85; DW = l.90 
(5) COMMUNP = 0.95 COMMUNPL + 0.10 GDPE- 0.03 ASIAN+ 5.85 DUTCH 
(3.26) (0.73) (-0.37) (3.05) 
RHO= 0.20, t = 0.75 r2 =0.976; F = 92.11; DW = l.97 
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TABLE 8 (Cont'd) 
(ordinary least squares estimates) 
Finance (FINP) 
(6) FINP = 0.86 FINPL- 0.03 GDPE 
(5.94) (--0.60) 
RHO= 0.56, t = 2.54 r2 = 0.879; F = 39.88; DW = l.82 
(7) FINP = 0.31 FINPL- 0.06 GDPE + 1.09 ARAB 
(l.73) (-l.44) (3.92) 
RHO= 0.15, t = 0.59 r2 = 0.979; F = 202.53; DW = l.77 
(8) FINP = 0.54 FINPL- 0.04 GDPE + 0.98 ARAB - 0.15 ASIAN 
(l.94) (--0.97) (3.84) (--0.75) 
RHO= - 0.28, t = - 0.10 r2 = 0.989; F = 209.16; DW = l.91 
(9) FINP = 0.44 FINPL - 0.03 GINPE + 0.72 ARAB + 11.25 DlITCH 
(3.12) (--0.79) (2.63) (l.71) 
RHO = - 0.09, t = - 0.35 r2 = 0.992; F = 289.04; OW= 2.04 
(10) FINP = l.01 FINPL + 0.02 GINPE- 0.23 ASIAN+ 20.67 DUTCH 
( 4.36) (0.40) (-l.31) (3.33) 
RHO= - 0.20, t = -0.77 r2 = 0.985; F = 219.74; OW= 2.03 
Insurance (INSP) 
(l) INSP = 0.85 INSPL - 0.05 GDP 
(8.93) (-1.62) 
RHO =-0.86, t=-6.53 r2 = 0.966; F = 157.12; OW= l.52 
(2) INSP = - 0.65 INSPL + 0.03 GDP + 0.19 ARAB 
(-2.14) (o.41) (3.70) 
RHO = 0.53, t = 2.33 r2 = 0.62; F = 6.99; OW= 1.53 
(3) INSP=-0.69INSPL+ 0.03GDP+0.18ARAB+O.Ol ASIAN 
(-1.98) (0.44) (2.74) (0.20) 
RHO= 0.54, t = 2.45 r2 = 0.66; F = 4.45, OW= 1.52 
Real Estate (REALP) 
(4) REALP = l.10 REALPL + 0.02 GDPE 
(5.99) (0.42) 
RHO =-0.35, t =- l.42 r2 = 0.951; F= 106.39; OW= 2.15 
(5) REALP=0.84REALPL+O.Ol GDPE+0.17 ARAB 
(3.42) (0.28) (l.45) 
RHO= - 0.30, t = - l.16 r2 = 0.956; F = 71.92; OW= 2.09 
(6) REALP = - 0.09 REALPL- 0.04 GDPE + 0.05 ARAB + 0.35 ASIAN 
(--0.26) (-1.21) (0.29) (2.28) 
RHO= 0.24, t = 0.94; r2 = 0.921; F = 26.05; OW= l.91 
(7) REALP = 0.01 REALPL- 0.03 GDPE + 0.30 ASIAN + 6.95 DlITCH 
(0.16) (--0.83) (2.91) (l.69) 
RHO= - 0.08, t = - 0.29 r2 = 0.965; F = 61.63; DW = 2.09 
Private Household Services (PHSP) 
(8) PHSP = 0.63 PHSPL + 0.06 GDPE + 0.20 ARAB 
(2.03) (l.45) (l.58) 
RHO= 0.07, t = 0.26 r2 = 0.482; F = 3.10; OW= l.94 
(9) PHSP = 0.47 PHSPL + 0.04 GDPE + 0.35 ARAB - 0.11 ASIAN 
(0.47) (0.80) (l.44) (--0.75) 
RHO= 0.14, t = 0.53 r2 = 0.493; F = l.94; OW= l.89 
(10) PHSP = 0.37 PHSPL + 0.06 GOPE- 0.13 ARAB+ 18.42 DUTCH 
(l.31) (l.78) (--0.87) (2.58) 
RH0=-0.29; t=- l.14 r2=0.805; F=9.31; DW=2.28 
Notes: See Table 6. 
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LE CHOIX DE LA MAIN-D'OEUVRE DANS UN PETIT ETAT 
IMPORT A TEUR DE MAIN-D'OEUVRE : 
L'INFLUENCE DE LA COMPOSITION ETHNIQUE 
SUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DU KOWEIT 
Suite a la liberation du Kowelt, le Gouvernement a accelere son 
remplacement des travailleurs arabes (la plupart Palestiniens et 
Jordaniens) par des travailleurs d'origine asiatique. Le but de cet 
ouvrage est d'evaluer si ce choix peut etre considere comme realiste 
dans la perspective d'une reduction du cout general de la main-
d'oeuvre expatriee. Quels secteurs de l'economie seraient les plus 
prometteurs a cet egard? Quels seront les coOts pour l'economie? 
En se fondant sur une analyse de l'economie du Kowelt avant 
l'invasion, l'auteur aboutit a la conclusion principale selon laquelle 
les travailleurs arabes expatries contribuaient a l'expansion du pays 
de fa9on nettement plus positive que leurs homologues asiatiques. Si 
l'on ne peut pas attribuer ce constat de fa9on indeniable au niveau de 
productivite relativement eleve des Arabes expatries, le fait est que 
l'accroissement de la main-d'oeuvre asiatique n'a pas reellement 
donne lieu a l'augmentation de production que l'on aurait pu croire. 
LAS OPCIONES DE MANO DE OBRA EN UN PEQUENO PAIS 
DE INMIGRACION LABORAL: LA INFLUENCIA DE LA 
COMPOSICION ETNICA EN EL DESARROLLO DE KUWAIT 
Como consecuencia de su liberaci6n, el Gobierno de Kuwait aceler6 
el reemplazamiento de los trabajadores arabes (en su mayoria palestinos 
y jordanos) por otros de origen asiatico. El objetivo de este articulo 
es evaluar si esta es una alternativa realistica con miras a reducir el 
costo total de la fuerza laboral expatriada i,En que areas la economia 
seria mas prometedora a este respecto? j,Cuales son los costos 
econ6micos? 
Basandose en un analisis de la economia previa a la invasi6n, los 
principales resultados de este estudio sefialan que la fuerza laboral 
expatriada arabe contribuy6 de manera mucho mas positiva a la 
expansi6n del pafs que su contraparte asiatica. Si bien aun no esta 
completamente claro que esto resulte exclusivamente de los grados 
relativamente elevados de productividad que poseen los expatriados 
arabes, es un hecho que la expansion de la fuerza laboral asiatica no 
produjo los incrementos correspondientes esperados en la producci6n 
econ6mica. 
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